Voting Machine Passwords are Definitely NOT Compromised

Judging by the huge surge in the number of Views for my “Special Conspiracy Theorist” series, it seems that the lies and misrepresentations of the Red-Hat-Wearing country bumpkins who believe anything Orange-Man-With-A-Silver-Tongue says, are finally being EXPOSED.

The topic for today’s “fact check” is the idea that Passwords used to protect accounts for election machines, aka “hardened computers”, could ever be compromised, shared, illegally transmitted or the most LAUGHABLE concept…..GUESSED.

To think that a slow thinking deplorable could guess the value of an administrative password like “12345678” is a disservice to the fine men/him/he’s and women/she/her’s of the EAC. They certified these election machines as being part of our critical infrastructure. The EAC understands that the pillars of our Democracy rest on the broad shoulders of Election Machines.

Do you really think that critical infrastructure would use common admin user names and shared passwords distributed via email? That was standard practice in the 1990’s along with using Mapquest, AOL and WindowsXP. Even if they were, this is 100% secure email being sent over a 100% secure internet not accessible to CCP hackers.

What about complex password rules like “must include special characters, lower and upper case, minimum numbers of characters”, etc…As you will see below, these complex password rules are ALWAYS enforceable on these machines.

Anyway, just to prove my points to all the knucklehead drones who believe anything you see on Truth Social, review the excerpts below. These email excerpts are taken from the same references as my other three articles Part1, Part2 and Part3.

If you navigate to the Sheriff Dar Leaf’s X account, you will find files which contain emails from DVS.

https://twitter.com/SheriffLeaf

https://x.com/SheriffLeaf/status/1769758994120274040

Review the full context then…..REPENT before it is too late.

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I restore the backup as is and used Tabulator 101

Password "Pr3$ld3ntl@IPrlm@ry90'2020"

[authors note: PresidentialPrimary90’2020, how clever….]

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Step 11: Insert credentials. Username: Admin Password: 12345678 Press OK

[authors note: This is what I mean, MAGADonian proof 100%]

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Subject: RE: VPN access with City

Ronald- did you change the password of the main workstation you were using to monitor the listener??? I need access via phone …. and old pwd doesn't work.

DIRECTOR, PRODUCT STRATEGY AND SECURITY

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Thanks for assisting us with the Secure Desktop initiative and helping us test the new GPO settings, etc.

As you know Security is a must and one of the easiest ways to get into a laptop is to know the local admin password. For this and many other reason, the process for obtaining local admin access for your machines will now be a bit more measured. Below are two options we are offering. We have two options which should be able to solve our teams use cases.

1. Temporary Local Admin access - We can provide the credentials for temporary access when needed. This should be enough for most users in the company. If you need to install software or make other administrator level changes, we can provide the credentials to you for the length of time needed to complete your work.

[author’s note: see how secure that is, instead of YOU creating your own password for your account, someone else who know’s your password gives it to you]

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Subject: RE: Boothole attack for Linux and Windows

* Classic-Will allow booting of a different device even with BIOS password set, unfortunately. We can (and should) ask …. to change this and disable the boot menu when a BIOS password is set. Secure Boot does not exist on this device, but it is EFI capable, so this may be something else to ask ….. to implement in Classic BIOS.

* Documentation - Our documentation already indicates that a BIOS password should be set for both devices. Suggestions:

* Short term - We can mitigate the issue by password protecting the boot device selection on the Classic.

* Long term - It would be good if we could spend some time on implementing Secure Boot, or a similar protection measure.

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It's already possible to enter passwords by numeric PC keyboard, but this means nothing with "Enter" disabled.

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The Project is located here -\Denmft\MFT_Customer\USA\AK-Alaska\StateofAlaska\00_Archive\DirectorsOffice\To_Dominion\DBfor Jeff\2020 REAA Election User is Admin and Password is#Elect2020

[author’s note: MAGAdonia proof not guessable, for sure]

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Sometime in the August of 2020, we discovered that some files in SW PDM CAD vault are one or more revisions ahead of the data in Omnify. Upon closer study, we found that their revisions had been raised with no change in the file content, by using the Admin account. A little side note about how SW PDM works - There are revisions and there are versions. In SW PDM, whenever a file is checked in, it is saved as a new version. Revisions are assigned by users as they wish. File versions cannot be tweaked as such. In SW PDM, files can be checked out, edited and checked in, only at WIP state. They cannot be modified in Approved For Production state, for example. When a file is checked in at WIP state, PDM history also shows a 'Checked in' step with a new 'version' of the file that may have been changed. When a file is being revved-up with no version change through the WIP state, there is no change in the file content. Most of these changes happened on Dec 12 and 13, 2017. I was on vacation during that time. ……. was the only other person who knew the Admin password to my knowledge. He is no longer with DVS now to ask what happened. As of today, over 350 files have been found to be affected, namely 224 in ICE, 40 in ICP1 and 87 in Ballot Box, Samson Design projects. If more are found in other projects in the future, we will update here.

[authors note: common admin account and password]

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Attached SD1 with results and D_Slog, and Data.xml (ALLTABULATORS), password: 1234

[author’s note: not guessable, for sure…]

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D-Suite 5.5-A (GA) EMS RTR 2 Liberty County GA: Results from the 'AV Midway County Office ICP' tabulator (tab# 151) are not included in the GA results export by portion or by precinct. The county tried loading then exporting from multiple versions of the GA export but all produced the same result. The results do appear properly on the SOVC report. I have loaded a backup copy to DVSP-FILE01\Releases. Username: county Password: 9Th$9Xo"%gn3SW$

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The passwords should be the same as for ICE Test SW, to maintain consistency, Field Tech Menu password is 11112300

[author’s note: not guessable, for sure…]

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Potential Vulnerabilility - On the administrative application it was found that the password field has autocomplete enabled. Allowing the browser to cache and store passwords for future visits to the application. Stored credentials can be captured by an attacker if the user's computer is compromised.

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I would like to be able to create a password with a larger upper limit. 8 to 10 characters is too small of a universe, something like 8 to 20 would be more flexible.

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I want to have the ability to create and use different, unique passwords for the Open Poll and Close Poll commands on the ICP2. This will prevent temporary part-time workers from accidentally closing the polls during early voting.

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Impossible to Login and Open the Poll, error: "Incorrect Password" occurs with each attempt.

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REAA Election User is Admin and Password is#Elect2020

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It would be good if the menu is behind a password, or if there could be some warning for the user as the change has major impact on scanning process.